Ghana has kept Sahel extremists out—but for how long?

Ghana has expanded military deployments, intelligence operations and community-based prevention programmes as extremist violence spreads south from the Sahel. But porous borders, youth unemployment, local conflicts and weakened regional cooperation mean the country cannot yet regard itself as fully prepared.

Kofi Boateng·5 min read·4 Sept 2026

Kenneth Gilbert Adjei, Minister for Defence

Ghana is more prepared for the threat of violent extremism than it was a decade ago. It has deployed troops to its northern frontier, established forward operating bases, strengthened intelligence operations and adopted programmes intended to prevent radicalisation.

But being better prepared is not the same as being fully protected.

The reported arrest of more than 300 people in connection with alleged extremist recruitment attempts between 2023 and 2025 alongside 47 reported cross-border incursions suggests that the threat may no longer be a distant problem confined to Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger.

The figures, disclosed by James Agalga, chairman of Parliament’s Defence and Interior Committee, require further official explanation. The public has not been told who was arrested, where the operations occurred, how many suspects were prosecuted or what authorities mean by a “cross-border incursion”.

Those questions matter. Arrests do not establish guilt, and the absence of such details makes it difficult to independently assess the scale of the threat or the effectiveness of Ghana’s response.

Nevertheless, the regional warning signs are unmistakable.

The threat is moving closer

Extremist violence in the Sahel has expanded towards the coastal states of West Africa. The Africa Center for Strategic Studies says Burkina Faso remained the Sahel country most affected by militant Islamist violence in 2025, while neighbouring Benin recorded its deadliest year and Togo suffered attacks that killed civilians and soldiers.

This puts Ghana in an increasingly dangerous neighbourhood.

The country shares an approximately 600-kilometre border with Burkina Faso, where armed groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State have expanded their operations. Unlike Benin and Togo, Ghana has so far avoided the sustained extremist attacks experienced by some of its neighbours.

That relative safety should be recognized but not mistaken for immunity.

A 2024 Reuters investigation reported allegations from unnamed Ghanaian security officials and regional diplomats that militants were crossing into northern Ghana for supplies and medical assistance. Ghana’s National Security Ministry rejected the report, denied operating any tacit non-aggression arrangement and said security agencies were conducting continuous counterterrorism operations with “notable successes”.

The competing accounts demonstrate why greater transparency is necessary.

Security agencies cannot disclose every operational detail, but Parliament and the public need enough verified information to distinguish successful prevention from reassuring official rhetoric.

Ghana has not been idle

It would be unfair to suggest that Ghana has done little to prepare.

Operation Conquered Fist has maintained a security presence in northern Ghana, supported by counterterrorism exercises involving the Armed Forces and other agencies. The government said in its 2024 budget presentation that 10 Mechanised Battalion in Wa, 11 Mechanised Battalion in Bawku and the development of 15 forward operating bases were intended to improve security along the northern border.

Ghana has also pursued regional cooperation through the Accra Initiative, established in 2017 to help coastal West African countries and their Sahel neighbours share intelligence and coordinate responses to violent extremism.

These are important foundations. Military patrols, surveillance, intelligence gathering and cooperation between border agencies can disrupt the movement of fighters, weapons and supplies.

But Ghana’s own assessment of the threat exposes the limitations of a strategy built mainly around security deployments.

A UNDP assessment found more than 80 unofficial crossing points along Ghana’s borders, as well as large areas that are difficult to patrol. Some informal routes are also vital to the economic and social lives of communities divided by national borders. Attempting to seal every route permanently would be practically impossible and could alienate the residents whose cooperation security agencies need.

The border cannot therefore be protected by soldiers and checkpoints alone.

The decisive battle may be inside border communities

Extremist organisations do not always begin by attacking a country. They may first establish relationships, identify grievances, recruit

informants, obtain supplies and win the silence of marginalised communities.

That makes public trust one of Ghana’s most valuable security assets.

A UNDP study involving nearly 1,400 respondents identified youth unemployment as the most common driver of vulnerability to violent extremism in Ghana’s five northern regions. It also pointed to political vigilantism, farmer-herder disputes, the availability of small arms and online radicalisation as areas of concern

A more recent UNDP commentary found that communities often regard unemployment, exclusion, poor services and unresolved conflicts as more immediate threats than cross-border infiltration. It warned of weak early-warning channels, inadequate state presence and limited awareness of the national “See Something, Say Something” campaign in some communities.

This is where Ghana’s preparedness will ultimately be tested.

If young people see little prospect of employment, distrust public institutions or believe their communities have been abandoned, extremists may find grievances they can manipulate. A border community without reliable schools, roads, healthcare, livelihoods or confidence in the state cannot be secured indefinitely by an army detachment.

Ghana has begun addressing this dimension. Government and development partners have introduced projects supporting livelihoods, peacebuilding and local governance in vulnerable northern districts. The BORDER Project, launched in 2025, is intended to address resource disputes, climate pressures and intercommunal tensions, while UN programmes have targeted women and young people with economic and peacebuilding interventions.

The concern is that many of these interventions remain limited projects rather than a sustained national security and development programme operating at the scale of the risk.

Regional divisions have weakened Ghana’s shield

No country can defeat a transnational extremist network by guarding only its side of the border.

Intelligence must move faster than fighters. Ghana therefore depends on

cooperation with Burkina Faso and other neighbouring states, regardless of political disagreements within the region.

President John Mahama acknowledged in January 2026 that political realignments and mistrust following the emergence of the Alliance of Sahel States had weakened the effectiveness of the Accra Initiative. He called for a renewed regional framework combining security action with development, governance and preventive diplomacy.

That admission is significant. Ghana may strengthen its domestic defences, but intelligence gaps across neighbouring countries can still create dangerous blind spots.

Rebuilding working relationships between ECOWAS members and the Sahel states should consequently be treated as an urgent security priority not merely a diplomatic ambition.

So, how prepared is Ghana?

The fairest answer is that Ghana has built a credible first line of defence, but significant weaknesses remain behind it.

The country has military deployments, counterterrorism structures, intelligence experience, regional partnerships and a growing recognition that prevention must include economic and social development.

Yet the threat continues to evolve faster than some of these safeguards. More than 80 unofficial crossings cannot all be watched. Regional intelligence cooperation has suffered. Northern communities still report economic exclusion, unemployment, local conflict and inadequate state services. Public information about arrests, prosecutions and incursions remains limited.

Ghana should now concentrate on five priorities: completing and adequately resourcing border infrastructure; strengthening intelligence sharing with every neighbouring state; connecting community reports to rapid official responses; investing consistently in education and livelihoods in vulnerable districts; and subjecting counterterrorism policy to confidential but rigorous parliamentary oversight.

Security operations must also remain lawful and proportionate. Heavy-handed arrests, ethnic profiling or mistreatment of border communities could create the grievances that extremist recruiters seek to exploit. Evidence from elsewhere in the Sahel shows that violence against civilians by state forces and allied groups can become a powerful recruitment tool for extremists.

Ghana’s greatest advantage is that it still has an opportunity to prevent a sustained insurgency instead of trying to defeat one after it has taken root.

That opportunity will be lost if the country measures preparedness only by troop numbers, arrests and border posts. The strongest border is one protected not only by security personnel, but also by communities that trust the state, reject extremist recruiters and believe they have a future worth defending.

Sources:

Africa Center