Political appointments are weakening Ghana’s state enterprises, IMF warns

The International Monetary Fund has identified political appointments to the boards and management of Ghana’s state-owned enterprises as a major governance weakness, warning that the practice is undermining independence, professionalism and accountability.

In its latest Technical Assistance Report examining Ghana’s state enterprises in 2024, the IMF said that although the country had designed a framework for more structured and merit-based appointments, the process remained heavily controlled by the presidency.

“In practice appointments remain highly political and centralised in the Presidency,” the report said.

The Fund said the governance weakness was particularly concerning because Ghana’s state-owned enterprises recorded combined liabilities of about GH¢282 billion in 2024—equivalent to roughly 25% of the country’s gross

domestic product.

The 10 largest enterprises accounted for approximately 85% of those liabilities, with the Electricity Company of Ghana, Volta River Authority and Ghana Cocoa Board identified among the institutions presenting the greatest fiscal risks.

The IMF said the boards of major state enterprises were largely dominated by political appointees, with ministers, Members of Parliament and senior party officials frequently serving as chairpersons or members.

It cited the Ghana Ports and Harbours Authority, where the board was chaired by the national chairman of the governing party. According to the report, that arrangement continued following the change of government in 2025.

The VRA was also cited as having prominent politicians serving alongside technocrats and a traditional leader.

The IMF said such arrangements departed significantly from standards advocated by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, which caution against active politicians sitting on state-enterprise boards and favour majorities made up of independent professionals.

Its concern, the report indicated, was not limited to the political identities of individual board members.

The Fund argued that boards without sufficient independence could struggle to scrutinise management, protect public assets and hold executives responsible for financial and operational decisions.

It also raised concerns about the appointment of chief executives and managing directors, saying SOE boards played only a limited role in selecting them.

According to the report, chief executives are typically appointed by the President, often in consultation with the relevant minister, instead of being recruited by boards through a competitive process.

The IMF said this weakened the accountability relationship between boards and the executives whose performance they were expected to oversee.

It also pointed to limited public disclosure of the criteria used to select board members and chief executives or the results of their performance evaluations.

COCOBOD committees questioned

The Ghana Cocoa Board was cited over what the IMF described as a “politicised committee ecosystem”.

The report said senior political figures led key committees, including COCOBOD’s Finance Committee.

Although the committees covered important areas, the IMF said extensive political leadership limited their independence and could complicate efforts to balance the organisation’s commercial objectives with its social responsibilities.

The report identified three broader constraints on Ghana’s SOE reforms: politicised appointments, inadequate separation between the state’s ownership and policy roles, and weak transparency.

Governance concerns were also reflected in financial and procurement irregularities recorded by the Auditor-General, it said.

According to the IMF, the largest proportion of irregularities occurred among SOEs operating in the energy and road-construction sectors. The Fund linked the findings to poor board oversight, political interference and ineffective or unethical management practices.

The report warned that SOE debts and losses could become a direct burden on the public finances through government assistance, state-backed borrowing, accumulated arrears and other financial activities undertaken on behalf of public policy.

Where an enterprise ultimately requires government intervention, the cost can effectively be transferred to taxpayers.

Merit-based appointments proposed

The IMF said Ghana already had the foundations for a more professional appointment system through its State Ownership Policy.

Under the policy, the State Interests and Governance Authority is expected to develop a nomination framework for identifying, vetting and shortlisting candidates for board and chief executive positions.

The framework should also create a pool of qualified directors and establish procedures for removing appointees.

However, the Fund said implementation remained at an early stage.

It recommended that Ghana establish a genuinely transparent and merit-based process, progressively reduce the number of active politicians serving on SOE boards and appoint more independent professionals and sector specialists.

The IMF also called for structured corporate-governance training for board members, particularly in technical sectors where suitably experienced candidates could be difficult to find.

The supplied material does not include a response from the government, SIGA or any of the state enterprises named in the report.